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News Release
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Abbott Ignored Juvenile Abuse for Months, But Now Claims Credit for Indictments Media hungry AG had no appetite to prosecute TYC sex abusers last year
Attorney General Greg Abbott sent out a press release minutes after a Ward County Grand Jury indicted TYC officials Ray Brookins and John Hernandez for sexual abuse of juveniles. Abbott's release, however, failed to mention that his office was notified of the widespread abuse more than a year ago. Abbott's office made no effort to prosecute the sexual offenders or to bring their offenses to the attention of the media or the State Legislature. The Lone Star Project detailed Abbott’s negligence in a recent report. (Read the report here)
"If Greg Abbott cared as much about ending child sexual abuse as he does about his own press clippings, then Texas children would be much safer," said Lone Star Project Director Matt Angle. “Abbott twiddled his thumbs for over a year knowing that Texas children were living a nightmare of abuse under State supervision. Trying to claim credit now is the cynical and shameful act of a crass politician."
Abbott’s office was formally notified of the widespread abuse at TYC facilities by Texas Ranger Brian Burzynski in a memo to Assistant Attorney General, William Tatum. The memo to Tatum pleaded for assistance saying he was dealing with, "a very weak prosecutor…that didn’t want to [file charges]…He hasn’t done anything with it and I am losing hope that he will." He goes on to ask, "Is this something that the AG’s office could review and perhaps consider a prosecution on, or perhaps, assist the local prosecutor with?" (See the email here) Rather than immediately contact the Ward County DA and offer assistance prosecuting the case, Abbott’s office ignored the crisis and allowed the abuse to continue.
Abbott’s office did nothing to help the local DA or push the prosecution for almost a year before the local DA explicitly asked for help in January 2007. Even then, it has taken Abbott’s office more than three months to win indictments of TYC officials with overwhelming evidence of sexual and physical abuse against them.
"Abbott’s press release should have been titled – Slow, Incompetent and Uncaring," continued Angle. "No Texan should have confidence in an Attorney General who takes more than a year to prosecute serial child molesters."
Timeline: February 21, 2006 - Texas Ranger Brian Burzynski sends a memo to Assistant Attorney General, William Tatum asking for the Attorney General’s help.
2 day wait
February 23, 2006 – Ranger Burzynski sends Assistant Attorney General, William Tatum a reminder email. Tatum replies with a short email to Texas Ranger Brian Burzynski offering no help unless Burzynski could talk the local DA into asking for help
328 day wait
Jan. 17, 2007 – Ward County District Attorney Randy Reynolds requested prosecutorial assistance
83 day wait
April 10, 2007 – Attorney General obtains indictments
Total Wait from time Ranger Burzynski sought help to indictments: 413 Days
What were the indicted men doing, while the Attorney General’s Office did nothing?
John Paul Hernandez After being allowed to quietly quit the TYC, "Hernandez was a principal at the Richard Milburn Academy in Midland." (Odessa American, February 21, 2007)
Richard Milburn Academy boasts on its website that, "The safety of its students and staff is one of RMA’s top priorities. All RMA staff members are assigned Hall Duty shifts to ensure students are in their classes and that no visitor is unaccompanied. Where appropriate, RMA has on-site security guards and works with the local police department to maintain the safety of all students."
Ray Brookins Once accused of the abuse, Ray Brookins quit his job at the TYC and "landed a job as a front desk manager for a swanky hotel in Austin." (The Houston Chronicle, March 21, 2007)
Ray Brookins was also updating his MySpace profile. (MySpace is a social networking website frequently used by children and young adults to talk with their friends) According to the Austin American-Statesman Ray Brookins used the name "XXXRayVijon" and "posted a photo of himself at the Adult Entertainment Expo in Las Vegas." (Austin American-Statesman, March 6, 2007)
The Lone Star Project is an activity of the Lone Star Fund. Contributions or gifts to the Lone Star Fund are not tax deductible. All contributions are subject to the prohibitions and limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Federal Law requires us to use best efforts to collect and report the name, mailing address, occupation and name of employer of individuals whose contributions exceed $200 in a calendar year.
Paid for by The Lone Star Fund, 6 E St, SE, Washington, DC 20003. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.
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Showing posts with label CCA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CCA. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
adjective
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
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NUMBER 13-02-00020-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
NATIVIDAD VALENCIA A/K/A TIVIE VALENCIA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
DISSENTING OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
The majority concludes that the evidence in this case is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for bribery. Specifically, the majority holds that the evidence of appellant’s offer to vote for or recommend the appointment of two applicants for vacant constable positions is commensurate with an offer of a “benefit” under the bribery statute. Because I conclude the evidence is legally insufficient, I respectfully dissent.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rosillo v. State, 953 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref’d). We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In conducting this analysis, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
1. The Bribery Statute
A person commits the offense of bribery if he intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another any benefit as consideration for the recipient’s decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). “Benefit” means anything reasonably regarded as a pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage. Id. § 36.01(3). It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office or he lacked jurisdiction or for any other reason. Id. § 36.02(b).
2. Analysis
In this case, in order to prove appellant guilty of bribery as indicted, the State was required to show that Valencia (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) offered, conferred, or agreed to confer (3) a benefit (4) as consideration for Josaphat Lozano and Juan Rodriguez’s decision or exercise of discretion as public servants to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla and Ofelio Muniz, respectively.
a. Lack of a Benefit
In its opinion, the majority reasons that a single vote or recommendation equates to a benefit under the penal code. I disagree. As defined in the penal code, “benefit” means “anything reasonably regarded as pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage . . . .” Id. § 36.01(3) (Vernon 2003). While I acquiesce in the fact that the legislature, by including the descriptive phrase “reasonably regarded as” in the definition of a benefit, intended the definition to be broader than mere “pecuniary gain or advantage,” the majority fails to explain just how a single vote or recommendation can be reasonably regarded as pecuniary in nature.
The majority emphasizes the fact that appellant was a member of the Cameron County Commissioners Court when he offered to support Lozano and Rodriguez for the vacant constable positions. Footnote Yet, a county commissioner cannot unilaterally appoint an individual to fill a vacancy in the constable’s office; rather it requires a majority of the commissioners court to accomplish the same. Footnote Thus, at most, appellant offered one of three votes necessary for the appointments of Lozano and Rodriguez to the positions of county constable. This begs the question of how a single vote or recommendation can be reasonably regarded as pecuniary in nature. The majority falls short in answering this question. In fact, the only evidence the majority finds to substantiate its conclusion that appellant’s vote or recommendation was a benefit as contemplated by the bribery statute is the testimony of Lozano that the county constable position was paid an annual salary of approximately $34,800. This evidence contemplates that appellant was offering a job to Lozano and Rodriguez as part of the bribe. See Kaisner v. State, 772 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1989, pet. ref’d) (offering job of chief deputy sheriff to candidate for sheriff if he agreed to withdraw from runoff election). However, there is no evidence in the record that appellant was offering or ensuring Lozano and Rodriguez the county constable positions. It is undisputed that the only offer made was an offer to support Lozano and Rodriguez for the vacant constable positions. While under certain circumstances a vote or recommendation may be construed as a gain or advantage, the majority’s holding effectively eradicates the pecuniary requirement from the bribery statute.
To the contrary, offenses traditionally prosecuted under the bribery statute involve the exchange of a benefit which can be readily valued in terms of money. See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1982) (providing the services of a prostitute at no cost to the recipient); Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (paying a district judge $59,000 to receive a probated sentence); Roseman v. State, 382 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (paying police officer $20 to persuade him not to arrest defendant in the future for violating the gaming and liquor laws); Smith v. State, 959 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, pet. ref’d) (providing round-trip plane tickets, hotel accommodations, meals, ground transportation, and theater tickets at no cost to defendant’s wife); Lima v. State, 788 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1990, pet. ref’d) (conferring a benefit of nine yards of concrete on city inspector in violation of inspector’s duty imposed by law); Tweedy v. State, 722 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) (offering $200 to city construction inspector to allow defendant and his work crew to dig trenches, lay pipe, and backfill the trenches without the inspector examining the work); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1131 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “pecuniary” in part as something which can be valued in money). Even the lone case cited by the majority in its analysis conforms with this line of cases. See Kaisner, 772 S.W.2d at 529 (offering job of chief deputy sheriff to candidate for sheriff if he agreed to withdraw from runoff election).
In light of the established case law, I conclude that appellant’s vote or recommendation is not reasonably regarded as a pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage as contemplated by the bribery statute. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.01(3) (Vernon 2003). Thus, I would hold there is no evidence that appellant had a “benefit” to offer as consideration for the alleged bribe. Accordingly, I would hold that a rational trier of facts could not have found the essential elements of the offense of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
b. Lack of Discretion to Hire or Employ
The State was also required to show that appellant made the offer of a benefit to Lozano and Rodriguez as consideration for their decision or exercise of discretion as public servants to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla and Ofelio Muniz, respectively.
The “exercise of discretion” contemplated by the statute involves the discretion one exercises in performing his duties as a public servant. In the instant case, however, the public servant in question, the county constable, did not have an unfettered right to hire or employ deputy constables. An elected constable who desires to appoint a deputy must apply in writing to the commissioners court of the county and show that the appointment is necessary to properly handle the business of the constable’s office originating in the precinct. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.011(a) (Vernon 1999). The county commissioners court has the authority to approve and confirm the appointment, if it finds the appointment of the deputy necessary. Id. In fact, it is an offense for an elected constable to deputize someone without first obtaining approval from the commissioners court. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.011(d) (Vernon 1999). Thus, at most, a constable has the discretion to nominate or appoint a candidate for a deputy constable position and the candidate is hired only if the commissioners court gives its consent. As a county commissioner, appellant knew this procedure.
Accordingly, I conclude there is no evidence that hiring or employing Rolando Mancilla or Ofelio Muniz was a “decision . . . or other exercise of discretion” of Lozano and Rodriguez under the bribery statute. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).
c. Bilateral Agreement
Appellant also relies on the case of McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). In that case, the defendant was convicted of bribery pursuant to an indictment that alleged he conferred a benefit as consideration for the recipient’s vote as a juror in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 136. After construing the language of the bribery statute, the court of criminal appeals stated “we construe the offense, particularly where it alleges the accused intentionally or knowingly conferred ‘a benefit as consideration for’ . . . as requiring a bilateral arrangement – in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official function.” Id. Concluding there was no evidence of a bilateral agreement between the defendant and the recipient of the benefit, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 139. Likewise, in the instant case, there could be no agreement to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla or Ofelio Muniz because Lozano and Rodriguez did not have the absolute discretion to do so. Footnote
B. Conclusion
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the proper light, I conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the offense of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Accordingly, I would hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for two counts of bribery.
I would sustain appellant’s first issue, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render a judgment of acquittal on the two counts alleged in the indictment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Dissenting Opinion delivered and filed this the
24th day of June, 2004.
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
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NUMBER 13-02-00020-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
NATIVIDAD VALENCIA A/K/A TIVIE VALENCIA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
DISSENTING OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
The majority concludes that the evidence in this case is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for bribery. Specifically, the majority holds that the evidence of appellant’s offer to vote for or recommend the appointment of two applicants for vacant constable positions is commensurate with an offer of a “benefit” under the bribery statute. Because I conclude the evidence is legally insufficient, I respectfully dissent.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rosillo v. State, 953 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref’d). We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In conducting this analysis, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
1. The Bribery Statute
A person commits the offense of bribery if he intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another any benefit as consideration for the recipient’s decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). “Benefit” means anything reasonably regarded as a pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage. Id. § 36.01(3). It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office or he lacked jurisdiction or for any other reason. Id. § 36.02(b).
2. Analysis
In this case, in order to prove appellant guilty of bribery as indicted, the State was required to show that Valencia (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) offered, conferred, or agreed to confer (3) a benefit (4) as consideration for Josaphat Lozano and Juan Rodriguez’s decision or exercise of discretion as public servants to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla and Ofelio Muniz, respectively.
a. Lack of a Benefit
In its opinion, the majority reasons that a single vote or recommendation equates to a benefit under the penal code. I disagree. As defined in the penal code, “benefit” means “anything reasonably regarded as pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage . . . .” Id. § 36.01(3) (Vernon 2003). While I acquiesce in the fact that the legislature, by including the descriptive phrase “reasonably regarded as” in the definition of a benefit, intended the definition to be broader than mere “pecuniary gain or advantage,” the majority fails to explain just how a single vote or recommendation can be reasonably regarded as pecuniary in nature.
The majority emphasizes the fact that appellant was a member of the Cameron County Commissioners Court when he offered to support Lozano and Rodriguez for the vacant constable positions. Footnote Yet, a county commissioner cannot unilaterally appoint an individual to fill a vacancy in the constable’s office; rather it requires a majority of the commissioners court to accomplish the same. Footnote Thus, at most, appellant offered one of three votes necessary for the appointments of Lozano and Rodriguez to the positions of county constable. This begs the question of how a single vote or recommendation can be reasonably regarded as pecuniary in nature. The majority falls short in answering this question. In fact, the only evidence the majority finds to substantiate its conclusion that appellant’s vote or recommendation was a benefit as contemplated by the bribery statute is the testimony of Lozano that the county constable position was paid an annual salary of approximately $34,800. This evidence contemplates that appellant was offering a job to Lozano and Rodriguez as part of the bribe. See Kaisner v. State, 772 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1989, pet. ref’d) (offering job of chief deputy sheriff to candidate for sheriff if he agreed to withdraw from runoff election). However, there is no evidence in the record that appellant was offering or ensuring Lozano and Rodriguez the county constable positions. It is undisputed that the only offer made was an offer to support Lozano and Rodriguez for the vacant constable positions. While under certain circumstances a vote or recommendation may be construed as a gain or advantage, the majority’s holding effectively eradicates the pecuniary requirement from the bribery statute.
To the contrary, offenses traditionally prosecuted under the bribery statute involve the exchange of a benefit which can be readily valued in terms of money. See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1982) (providing the services of a prostitute at no cost to the recipient); Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (paying a district judge $59,000 to receive a probated sentence); Roseman v. State, 382 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (paying police officer $20 to persuade him not to arrest defendant in the future for violating the gaming and liquor laws); Smith v. State, 959 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, pet. ref’d) (providing round-trip plane tickets, hotel accommodations, meals, ground transportation, and theater tickets at no cost to defendant’s wife); Lima v. State, 788 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1990, pet. ref’d) (conferring a benefit of nine yards of concrete on city inspector in violation of inspector’s duty imposed by law); Tweedy v. State, 722 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) (offering $200 to city construction inspector to allow defendant and his work crew to dig trenches, lay pipe, and backfill the trenches without the inspector examining the work); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1131 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “pecuniary” in part as something which can be valued in money). Even the lone case cited by the majority in its analysis conforms with this line of cases. See Kaisner, 772 S.W.2d at 529 (offering job of chief deputy sheriff to candidate for sheriff if he agreed to withdraw from runoff election).
In light of the established case law, I conclude that appellant’s vote or recommendation is not reasonably regarded as a pecuniary gain or pecuniary advantage as contemplated by the bribery statute. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.01(3) (Vernon 2003). Thus, I would hold there is no evidence that appellant had a “benefit” to offer as consideration for the alleged bribe. Accordingly, I would hold that a rational trier of facts could not have found the essential elements of the offense of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
b. Lack of Discretion to Hire or Employ
The State was also required to show that appellant made the offer of a benefit to Lozano and Rodriguez as consideration for their decision or exercise of discretion as public servants to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla and Ofelio Muniz, respectively.
The “exercise of discretion” contemplated by the statute involves the discretion one exercises in performing his duties as a public servant. In the instant case, however, the public servant in question, the county constable, did not have an unfettered right to hire or employ deputy constables. An elected constable who desires to appoint a deputy must apply in writing to the commissioners court of the county and show that the appointment is necessary to properly handle the business of the constable’s office originating in the precinct. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.011(a) (Vernon 1999). The county commissioners court has the authority to approve and confirm the appointment, if it finds the appointment of the deputy necessary. Id. In fact, it is an offense for an elected constable to deputize someone without first obtaining approval from the commissioners court. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 86.011(d) (Vernon 1999). Thus, at most, a constable has the discretion to nominate or appoint a candidate for a deputy constable position and the candidate is hired only if the commissioners court gives its consent. As a county commissioner, appellant knew this procedure.
Accordingly, I conclude there is no evidence that hiring or employing Rolando Mancilla or Ofelio Muniz was a “decision . . . or other exercise of discretion” of Lozano and Rodriguez under the bribery statute. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).
c. Bilateral Agreement
Appellant also relies on the case of McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). In that case, the defendant was convicted of bribery pursuant to an indictment that alleged he conferred a benefit as consideration for the recipient’s vote as a juror in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 136. After construing the language of the bribery statute, the court of criminal appeals stated “we construe the offense, particularly where it alleges the accused intentionally or knowingly conferred ‘a benefit as consideration for’ . . . as requiring a bilateral arrangement – in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official function.” Id. Concluding there was no evidence of a bilateral agreement between the defendant and the recipient of the benefit, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 139. Likewise, in the instant case, there could be no agreement to hire or employ Rolando Mancilla or Ofelio Muniz because Lozano and Rodriguez did not have the absolute discretion to do so. Footnote
B. Conclusion
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the proper light, I conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the offense of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Accordingly, I would hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for two counts of bribery.
I would sustain appellant’s first issue, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render a judgment of acquittal on the two counts alleged in the indictment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Dissenting Opinion delivered and filed this the
24th day of June, 2004.
Saturday, January 19, 2008
Better put 'em in quotations........
adjective
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
Take all of your wasted honor.
Every little past frustration.
Take all of your so called problems,
Better put 'em in quotations.
Say what you need to say (x8)
Walkin' like a one man army,
Fightin' with the shadows in your head.
Livin' up the same old moment
Knowin' you'd be better off instead
If you could only...Say what you need to say (x8)
Have no fear for givin' in.
[Say What You Need To Say lyrics on http://www.metrolyrics.com]
Have no fear for giving over.
You better know that in the end
It's better to say too much, than never to say what you need to say again.
Even if your hands are shaking,
And your faith is broken.
Even as the eyes are closin',
Do it with a heart wide open.
Say what you need to say (x7)
Say what you need to, Say what you need to...
Say what you need to say.
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
Take all of your wasted honor.
Every little past frustration.
Take all of your so called problems,
Better put 'em in quotations.
Say what you need to say (x8)
Walkin' like a one man army,
Fightin' with the shadows in your head.
Livin' up the same old moment
Knowin' you'd be better off instead
If you could only...Say what you need to say (x8)
Have no fear for givin' in.
[Say What You Need To Say lyrics on http://www.metrolyrics.com]
Have no fear for giving over.
You better know that in the end
It's better to say too much, than never to say what you need to say again.
Even if your hands are shaking,
And your faith is broken.
Even as the eyes are closin',
Do it with a heart wide open.
Say what you need to say (x7)
Say what you need to, Say what you need to...
Say what you need to say.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
A writ of mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy atlaw
adjective
GRANT JONES v. HONORABLE MIKE WESTERGREN (05/18/89)
[1] COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT, CORPUS CHRISTI
[2] No. 13-88-306-CV
[3] 1989.TX.40789; 771 S.W.2d 669
[4] May 18, 1989
[5] GRANT JONES, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE MIKE WESTERGREN, JUDGE OF THE 214TH JUDICIAL COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, RESPONDENT
[6] On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
[7] Jackson B. Smith, Jr.;*fn* Tom F. Coleman, Sr.; and * Robert R. Murray, J. J.
[8] Author: Smith
[9] In this original proceeding, the relator, Grant Jones, the District Attorney for Nueces County, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Mike Westergren, a District Judge in Nueces County, to vacate his order convening a Court of Inquiry pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 52.01.
[10] Relator asserts nine bases for relief that may be grouped as follows: (1) Art. 52.01 is unconstitutional on its face; (2) the court made procedural errors resulting in noncompliance with the provisions of Art. 52.01; (3) the trial judge is constitutionally disqualified to preside at the proceeding; and (4) that application of Art. 52.01 violates the relator's "due process" rights. Respondent asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to determine this cause.
[11] The facts of the case are relatively simple. On May 24, 1988, Judge Westergren signed an order convening a Court of Inquiry to commence a hearing on June 1, 1988, to investigate alleged illegal conduct of relator. On May 25th, subpoenas were served on relator and other named people in the District Attorney's Office. On May 27, 1988, Judge Westergren stayed his June 1st hearing, apparently based on an order of Judge Manuel Banales, Judge of the 105th District Court of Nueces County. The record before us contains nothing concerning the hearing before Judge Banales, but Judge Westergren's order of May 17th refers to the hearing as "partially addressed by motion to recuse." The record before this court does not reveal what disposition was made of the motion to recuse before Judge Banales.
[12] By letter dated July 19, 1988, Judge Westergren notified relator that he had "Lifted" his stay order of May 17th and ordered that the Court of Inquiry commence on August 29, 1988. On July 26, 1988, pursuant to relator's motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus and request for a temporary stay, this court granted leave to file the writ, and ordered a temporary stay of the Court of Inquiry proceedings.
[13] We first address the respondent's assertion that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider relator's petition because it is based on speculative, hypothetical, or contingent situations. He alleges that the suit is "premature" and "not yet ripe" for purposes of adjudication by the courts.
[14] Our review of the record shows that at the present time, a Court of Inquiry has been ordered by the respondent, subpoenas have been issued, and no evidence has been presented.
[15] The abstract and hypothetical factual and procedural situations that the relator has suggested may arise do not raise "due process" or other constitutional issues at this time. A court has no jurisdiction to render an opinion on a controversy that is not yet ripe. City of Garland v. Louton,691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985).
[16] To the extent that relator's petition seeks mandamus relief based upon facts that have not yet occurred and are merely hypothetical, we agree with respondent that this court does not have jurisdiction to render advisory opinions on factual situations that may or may not arise in the future. If the hypothetical facts suggested by relator in his brief should come to fruition, he has an adequate remedy at law by writ of habeas corpus.
[17] Relator asserts that respondent made procedural errors in the calling of the Court of Inquiry that void the order convening the Court of Inquiry, entitling relator to a writ of mandamus. He contends that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of Article 52, Tex.Code Crim.P. in the following respects: (1) respondent's affidavit failed to state good cause to invoke respondent's authority to hold a Court of Inquiry; (2) respondent is interested in the outcome of the proceeding and is disqualified; (3) respondent is disqualified because he is relator's accuser, has been of counsel in the case, and may not be cross-examined because he is the judge in the case; and (4) the court's order is invalid because it fails to give adequate notice of the scope of the inquiry.
[18] A Court of Inquiry by a district judge is authorized by chapter 52 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant parts of chapter 52 to this case are:
[19] Art. 52.01
[20] (a) When a judge of any district court of this state, acting in his capacity as magistrate has good cause to believe that an offense has been committed against the laws of this state, he may summon and examine any witness in relation thereto in accordance with the rules hereinafter provided, which procedure is defined as a "Court of Inquiry."
[21] (b) Before calling a Court of Inquiry, a judge must:
[22] (1) enter into the minutes of his court a sworn affidavit stating the good cause establishing his belief that an offense has been committed against the laws of this state; and
[23] (2) no later than 10 days prior to the commencement of the Court of Inquiry, file with the district clerk a copy of the sworn affidavit and a written order calling the Court of Inquiry and stating its scope.
[24] (c) The district or county attorney of the district or county in which the Court of Inquiry is held shall assist the district judge in conducting the Court of Inquiry. The attorney shall examine witnesses and evidence admitted before the court to determine if an offense has been committed and shall render other assistance to the judge as is necessary in the proceeding.
[25] (d) If the Court of Inquiry pertains to the activities of the district or county attorney or to the attorney's office, deputies, or employees, or if the attorney is otherwise disqualified in the proceeding, the judge shall appoint one attorney pro tem to assist in the proceeding. In any other circumstance, the judge may appoint an attorney pro tem to assist in the proceeding.
[26] Art. 52.02
[27] At the hearing at a Court of Inquiry, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted, any witness against whom they may bear has the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants or to file answering affidavits. The judge in hearing such evidence, at his discretion, may conclude not to sustain objections to all or to any portion of the evidence taken nor exclude same; but any of the witnesses or attorneys engaged in taking the testimony may have any objections they make recorded with the testimony and reserved for the action of any court in which such evidence is thereafter sought to be admitted, but such court is not confined to objections made at the taking of the testimony of the Court of Inquiry. Without restricting the foregoing, the judge may allow the introduction of any documentary or real evidence which he deems reliable, and the testimony adduced before any grand jury.
[28] Art. 52.03
[29] The judge or his clerk has power to issue subpoenas which may be served within the same territorial limits as subpoenas issued in felony prosecutions or to summon witnesses before grand juries in this state.
[30] Art. 52.04
[31] All witnesses testifying in any Court of Inquiry have the same rights as to testifying as do defendants in felony prosecutions in this state. Before any witness is sworn to testify in any Court of Inquiry, he shall be instructed by the judge that he is entitled to counsel; that he cannot be forced to testify against himself; and that such testimony may be taken down and used against him in a later trial or trials ensuing from the instant Court of Inquiry. Any witness or his counsel has the right to fully cross-examine any of the witnesses whose testimony bears in any manner against him.
[32] Art. 52.05
[33] A person may be compelled to give testimony or produce evidence when legally called upon to do so at any Court of Inquiry; however, if any person refuses or declines to testify or produce evidence on the ground that it may incriminate him under laws of this state, then the judge may, in his discretion, compel such person to testify or produce evidence but the person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for, on or account of, any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may be compelled to testify or produce evidence at such Court of Inquiry.
[34] Art. 52.06
[35] Contempt of court in a Court of Inquiry may be punished by a fine not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and any witness refusing to testify may be attached and imprisoned until he does testify.
[36] Art. 52.07
[37] All evidence taken at a Court of Inquiry shall be transcribed by the court reporter and all proceedings shall be open to the public.
[38] Art. 52.08
[39] If it appear from a Court of Inquiry or any testimony adduced therein, that an offense has been committed, the Judge shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the offender as if complaint had been made and filed.
[40] The respondent's affidavit states as follows:
[41] STATE OF TEXAS
[42] COUNTY OF NUECES
[43] AFFIDAVIT
[44] I, Mike Westergren, Judge, 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas, have good cause to believe that District Attorney Grant Jones and other members of his staff acting under color of law and his office have intentionally denied and impeded one Bill Jensen and others in the exercise and enjoyment of the right of free speech to criticize in any manner however founded or unfounded, the operation of the office of the District Attorney including, but not limited to the dissemination of information some of which is undeniably public record concerning the wisdom or lack of wisdom in the hiring and continued employment of certain employees, and all other matters arising out of said transaction concerning the use of the District Attorney's official powers for his own self-protection and private purposes not contemplated or authorized by law. Specifically it is my belief that Grant Jones, District Attorney, has engaged in conduct constituting the offense of Official Oppression defined by Sec. 39.02, Texas Penal Code.
[45] My belief is based upon information which I have received as well as my own review of the pleadings filed in Cause No. 88-CR-420-D, the State of Texas v. Bill Jensen.
[46] Relator asserts that respondent initially erred procedurally by failing to state a good cause to convene the Court of Inquiry as required by article 52.02(b)(1). Specifically he contends that by failing to comply with this section of article 52, respondent failed to invoke the authority of his court, and his order convening the Court of Inquiry is void.
[47] The full context of respondent's affidavit is set out above and in essence states that the respondent has good cause to believe that the relator and other members of his staff acting under color of law have intentionally denied . . . the right of free speech to criticize in any manner the operation of the office of the District Attorney including, but not limited to, the dissemination of information . . . of public record concerning . . . employment of certain employees and all other matters arising out of . . . the use of the District Attorney's official powers for his own self protection and private purposes . . . constituting the offense of Official Oppression defined by section 39.02 of the Texas Penal Code.
[48] The cases cited by relator and respondent generally discuss the requisites for good cause in affidavits made the basis for warrants. However, neither party has cited us to any case that supports the contention that the requisites of an affidavit setting forth good cause under article 52 are as stringent as the requirements to show good cause on a complaint or on an affidavit to obtain a search warrant.
[49] The purpose of a Court of Inquiry, as its title indicates, is to inquire and to ascertain if illegal activity has occurred or is occurring. It is merely an investigative procedure to inquire into alleged illegal activity. Article 52 does not require that the affiant state with certainty that good cause exists but requires an affidavit "stating a good cause establishing his belief. " (Emphasis added.) It appears that the legislative intent, in using the phrase "establishing his belief" as a modifier to the phrase "good cause," was to require a less stringent requirement to establish good cause in an affidavit used as a basis to convene a Court of Inquiry. The rationale appears to be that the court has sufficient facts before it to have good cause to convene a hearing to inquire whether there is or is not illegal activity that has occurred or is occurring. We conclude that respondent's order is not void for failure of the affidavit to state a good cause as required by article 52.02(b)(1).
[50] We also note that relator has not cited any cases that hold such an error would be jurisdictional.
[51] The relator next contends, in several points of error, that the respondent is disqualified because he (1) is interested in the outcome of the Court of Inquiry; (2) has been of counsel in the case; and (3) is the accuser in this case, and relator cannot cross-examine him.
[52] Article 5, section 11 of the Texas Constitution states that no judge shall sit in any case where he may be interested, and Rule 18a, Tex.R.Civ.P. states as follows:
[53] At least 10 days before the date set for trial or other hearing in any court other than the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, or the Court of Appeals, any party may file with the clerk of the court a motion stating grounds why the judge before whom the case is pending should not sit in the case. The grounds may include any disability of the judge to sit in the case. The motion shall be verified and must state with particularity the grounds why the judge before whom the case is pending should not sit. The motion shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts that would be admissible in evidence provided that facts may be stated upon information and belief if the grounds of such belief are specifically stated.
[54] As heretofore noted, apparently some hearing was held before Judge Banales of the 105th District Court of Nueces County, pertaining to a motion to recuse. Because we do not have the record of that hearing, we do not know what allegations were made in the motion, and we do not know what disposition, if any, was made of the motion.
[55] Each of the relator's contentions made in the instant suit that the respondent is disqualified or should be recused may have been heard in the hearing before Judge Banales. Rule 18a(f) provides a method of appeal where a motion to recuse is denied.
[56] In the instant case, if the relator made all the allegations in the hearing before Judge Banales that he made in this case, and if his motion was denied, he had the right of appeal. In the event Judge Banales made no disposition of the relator's motion or in the event the allegations made by relator in the instant case were not made in the motion before Judge Banales, Rule 18a provides an adequate remedy at law for the relator.
[57] A writ of mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy at law. Strake v. Court of Appeals,704 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tex.1986); State ex rel. Jerry Cobb v. Godfrey, 739 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Because relator has an adequate remedy at law determining the issues of disqualification and recusal, a writ of mandamus is not the proper procedure to determine these issues.
[58] The relator also contends that the respondent's order is invalid because it fails to give adequate notice of the scope of the inquiry to be made.
[59] Relator does not contend that he has not received the 10-day statutory notice required by article 52.01(b)(2), but contends that the content of the respondent's affidavit is insufficient to give him adequate notice to defend himself as required by article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. Section 10 provides that an accused shall have the "right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof."
[60] Respondent's affidavit names one individual whose rights have been affected, it states what rights have been affected; it states in what case the alleged events have occurred; and it states what criminal statute has been violated. It does not state what the specific facts are, and, other than the relator, it does not specify the names of the parties referred to in the affidavit.
[61] Neither article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, nor article 52.01(b)(2), Tex. Code Crim. P. set forth the extent to which an affidavit must state specific facts to give adequate notice to persons subpoenaed to testify at a Court of Inquiry. We can find no cases on point, so we look to other case law for guidance.
[62] It is well established in Texas that in felony prosecutions, an indictment must specifically state the facts upon which the State relies so as to give the defendant adequate notice of the crime he allegedly committed. However, it appears to be equally well established that the requisites of a complaint or affidavit to support a prosecution under an information are not as stringent as the requirements for a complaint for a search or arrest warrant. Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 975); Gholson v. State, 667 S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex.App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd).
[63] If the requirements or the affidavits were less stringent, as in Wells and Gholson, where charged had been made and the defendants had been placed under arrest, it would seem less likely in an investigative procedure as here, where no charges have been filed and no arrest has been made, that the more stringent requirements of an affidavit for an arrest or search warrant would be required.
[64] Under federal law, where subpoenas have been issued by an administrative agency and notice requirements have been attacked, the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is not implicated because an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights. Likewise, the Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is not offended because criminal proceedings have not been initiated. S.E.C. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U. S. 735, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).
[65] As in O'Brien, the present case is an investigative matter, and no criminal proceedings have been initiated. Similarly, as in Wells and Gholson, it would seem that less stringent requirements for an affidavit would be necessary. This is especially so where the procedure is only investigative in nature, and criminal charges may or may not result. We conclude that the respondent's affidavit provides the relator with sufficient notice to apprise him of the scope of the inquiry to be made in the Court of Inquiry ordered by the respondent.
[66] Finally, we disagree with relator that article 52 is unconstitutional on its face and deprives him of his due process rights. A statute may be consistent with due process but by its application, or use, or by construction, be applied in a manner that would deny due process. Smith v. State, 311 U.S. 128, 85 L. Ed. 84, 61 S. Ct. 164 (1940).
[67] Although the Supreme Court of the United States in its memorandum opinion in McClelland v. State, 382 U.S. 928, 15 L. Ed. 2d 340, 86 S. Ct. 307 (1965), noted that the present Texas Court of Inquiry statute has "grave constitutional questions by conducting such proceedings," we are of the opinion that the constitutional questions alluded to by that court will only arise if in the statute's usage and construction, constitutional rights during the proceedings are not afforded to the parties involved. At the present time, the Court of Inquiry has not yet convened and the proceedings have not commenced. Although it may prove difficult under article 52 to provide constitutional safeguards, we will not presume that the respondent will deny the relator his due process constitutional rights when the Court of Inquiry is held. Because the relator has not shown that the respondent has clearly abused his discretion or violated a duty imposed upon him by the law, and because the relator has an adequate remedy at law, we hold that the relator is not entitled to the relief he has prayed for.
[68] This Court's order staying the Court of Inquiry hearing is hereby set aside, and the relator's petition for mandamus is overruled.
Judges Footnotes
[69] *fn* Assigned to this case by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code An.. § 74.003 (Vernon 1988).
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GRANT JONES v. HONORABLE MIKE WESTERGREN (05/18/89)
[1] COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT, CORPUS CHRISTI
[2] No. 13-88-306-CV
[3] 1989.TX.40789
[4] May 18, 1989
[5] GRANT JONES, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE MIKE WESTERGREN, JUDGE OF THE 214TH JUDICIAL COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, RESPONDENT
[6] On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
[7] Jackson B. Smith, Jr.;*fn* Tom F. Coleman, Sr.; and * Robert R. Murray, J. J.
[8] Author: Smith
[9] In this original proceeding, the relator, Grant Jones, the District Attorney for Nueces County, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Mike Westergren, a District Judge in Nueces County, to vacate his order convening a Court of Inquiry pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 52.01.
[10] Relator asserts nine bases for relief that may be grouped as follows: (1) Art. 52.01 is unconstitutional on its face; (2) the court made procedural errors resulting in noncompliance with the provisions of Art. 52.01; (3) the trial judge is constitutionally disqualified to preside at the proceeding; and (4) that application of Art. 52.01 violates the relator's "due process" rights. Respondent asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to determine this cause.
[11] The facts of the case are relatively simple. On May 24, 1988, Judge Westergren signed an order convening a Court of Inquiry to commence a hearing on June 1, 1988, to investigate alleged illegal conduct of relator. On May 25th, subpoenas were served on relator and other named people in the District Attorney's Office. On May 27, 1988, Judge Westergren stayed his June 1st hearing, apparently based on an order of Judge Manuel Banales, Judge of the 105th District Court of Nueces County. The record before us contains nothing concerning the hearing before Judge Banales, but Judge Westergren's order of May 17th refers to the hearing as "partially addressed by motion to recuse." The record before this court does not reveal what disposition was made of the motion to recuse before Judge Banales.
[12] By letter dated July 19, 1988, Judge Westergren notified relator that he had "Lifted" his stay order of May 17th and ordered that the Court of Inquiry commence on August 29, 1988. On July 26, 1988, pursuant to relator's motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus and request for a temporary stay, this court granted leave to file the writ, and ordered a temporary stay of the Court of Inquiry proceedings.
[13] We first address the respondent's assertion that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider relator's petition because it is based on speculative, hypothetical, or contingent situations. He alleges that the suit is "premature" and "not yet ripe" for purposes of adjudication by the courts.
[14] Our review of the record shows that at the present time, a Court of Inquiry has been ordered by the respondent, subpoenas have been issued, and no evidence has been presented.
[15] The abstract and hypothetical factual and procedural situations that the relator has suggested may arise do not raise "due process" or other constitutional issues at this time. A court has no jurisdiction to render an opinion on a controversy that is not yet ripe. City of Garland v. Louton,691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985).
[16] To the extent that relator's petition seeks mandamus relief based upon facts that have not yet occurred and are merely hypothetical, we agree with respondent that this court does not have jurisdiction to render advisory opinions on factual situations that may or may not arise in the future. If the hypothetical facts suggested by relator in his brief should come to fruition, he has an adequate remedy at law by writ of habeas corpus.
[17] Relator asserts that respondent made procedural errors in the calling of the Court of Inquiry that void the order convening the Court of Inquiry, entitling relator to a writ of mandamus. He contends that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of Article 52, Tex.Code Crim.P. in the following respects: (1) respondent's affidavit failed to state good cause to invoke respondent's authority to hold a Court of Inquiry; (2) respondent is interested in the outcome of the proceeding and is disqualified; (3) respondent is disqualified because he is relator's accuser, has been of counsel in the case, and may not be cross-examined because he is the judge in the case; and (4) the court's order is invalid because it fails to give adequate notice of the scope of the inquiry.
[18] A Court of Inquiry by a district judge is authorized by chapter 52 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant parts of chapter 52 to this case are:
[19] Art. 52.01
[20] (a) When a judge of any district court of this state, acting in his capacity as magistrate has good cause to believe that an offense has been committed against the laws of this state, he may summon and examine any witness in relation thereto in accordance with the rules hereinafter provided, which procedure is defined as a "Court of Inquiry."
[21] (b) Before calling a Court of Inquiry, a judge must:
[22] (1) enter into the minutes of his court a sworn affidavit stating the good cause establishing his belief that an offense has been committed against the laws of this state; and
[23] (2) no later than 10 days prior to the commencement of the Court of Inquiry, file with the district clerk a copy of the sworn affidavit and a written order calling the Court of Inquiry and stating its scope.
[24] (c) The district or county attorney of the district or county in which the Court of Inquiry is held shall assist the district judge in conducting the Court of Inquiry. The attorney shall examine witnesses and evidence admitted before the court to determine if an offense has been committed and shall render other assistance to the judge as is necessary in the proceeding.
[25] (d) If the Court of Inquiry pertains to the activities of the district or county attorney or to the attorney's office, deputies, or employees, or if the attorney is otherwise disqualified in the proceeding, the judge shall appoint one attorney pro tem to assist in the proceeding. In any other circumstance, the judge may appoint an attorney pro tem to assist in the proceeding.
[26] Art. 52.02
[27] At the hearing at a Court of Inquiry, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted, any witness against whom they may bear has the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants or to file answering affidavits. The judge in hearing such evidence, at his discretion, may conclude not to sustain objections to all or to any portion of the evidence taken nor exclude same; but any of the witnesses or attorneys engaged in taking the testimony may have any objections they make recorded with the testimony and reserved for the action of any court in which such evidence is thereafter sought to be admitted, but such court is not confined to objections made at the taking of the testimony of the Court of Inquiry. Without restricting the foregoing, the judge may allow the introduction of any documentary or real evidence which he deems reliable, and the testimony adduced before any grand jury.
[28] Art. 52.03
[29] The judge or his clerk has power to issue subpoenas which may be served within the same territorial limits as subpoenas issued in felony prosecutions or to summon witnesses before grand juries in this state.
[30] Art. 52.04
[31] All witnesses testifying in any Court of Inquiry have the same rights as to testifying as do defendants in felony prosecutions in this state. Before any witness is sworn to testify in any Court of Inquiry, he shall be instructed by the judge that he is entitled to counsel; that he cannot be forced to testify against himself; and that such testimony may be taken down and used against him in a later trial or trials ensuing from the instant Court of Inquiry. Any witness or his counsel has the right to fully cross-examine any of the witnesses whose testimony bears in any manner against him.
[32] Art. 52.05
[33] A person may be compelled to give testimony or produce evidence when legally called upon to do so at any Court of Inquiry; however, if any person refuses or declines to testify or produce evidence on the ground that it may incriminate him under laws of this state, then the judge may, in his discretion, compel such person to testify or produce evidence but the person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for, on or account of, any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may be compelled to testify or produce evidence at such Court of Inquiry.
[34] Art. 52.06
[35] Contempt of court in a Court of Inquiry may be punished by a fine not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and any witness refusing to testify may be attached and imprisoned until he does testify.
[36] Art. 52.07
[37] All evidence taken at a Court of Inquiry shall be transcribed by the court reporter and all proceedings shall be open to the public.
[38] Art. 52.08
[39] If it appear from a Court of Inquiry or any testimony adduced therein, that an offense has been committed, the Judge shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the offender as if complaint had been made and filed.
[40] The respondent's affidavit states as follows:
[41] STATE OF TEXAS
[42] COUNTY OF NUECES
[43] AFFIDAVIT
[44] I, Mike Westergren, Judge, 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas, have good cause to believe that District Attorney Grant Jones and other members of his staff acting under color of law and his office have intentionally denied and impeded one Bill Jensen and others in the exercise and enjoyment of the right of free speech to criticize in any manner however founded or unfounded, the operation of the office of the District Attorney including, but not limited to the dissemination of information some of which is undeniably public record concerning the wisdom or lack of wisdom in the hiring and continued employment of certain employees, and all other matters arising out of said transaction concerning the use of the District Attorney's official powers for his own self-protection and private purposes not contemplated or authorized by law. Specifically it is my belief that Grant Jones, District Attorney, has engaged in conduct constituting the offense of Official Oppression defined by Sec. 39.02, Texas Penal Code.
[45] My belief is based upon information which I have received as well as my own review of the pleadings filed in Cause No. 88-CR-420-D, the State of Texas v. Bill Jensen.
[46] Relator asserts that respondent initially erred procedurally by failing to state a good cause to convene the Court of Inquiry as required by article 52.02(b)(1). Specifically he contends that by failing to comply with this section of article 52, respondent failed to invoke the authority of his court, and his order convening the Court of Inquiry is void.
[47] The full context of respondent's affidavit is set out above and in essence states that the respondent has good cause to believe that the relator and other members of his staff acting under color of law have intentionally denied . . . the right of free speech to criticize in any manner the operation of the office of the District Attorney including, but not limited to, the dissemination of information . . . of public record concerning . . . employment of certain employees and all other matters arising out of . . . the use of the District Attorney's official powers for his own self protection and private purposes . . . constituting the offense of Official Oppression defined by section 39.02 of the Texas Penal Code.
[48] The cases cited by relator and respondent generally discuss the requisites for good cause in affidavits made the basis for warrants. However, neither party has cited us to any case that supports the contention that the requisites of an affidavit setting forth good cause under article 52 are as stringent as the requirements to show good cause on a complaint or on an affidavit to obtain a search warrant.
[49] The purpose of a Court of Inquiry, as its title indicates, is to inquire and to ascertain if illegal activity has occurred or is occurring. It is merely an investigative procedure to inquire into alleged illegal activity. Article 52 does not require that the affiant state with certainty that good cause exists but requires an affidavit "stating a good cause establishing his belief. " (Emphasis added.) It appears that the legislative intent, in using the phrase "establishing his belief" as a modifier to the phrase "good cause," was to require a less stringent requirement to establish good cause in an affidavit used as a basis to convene a Court of Inquiry. The rationale appears to be that the court has sufficient facts before it to have good cause to convene a hearing to inquire whether there is or is not illegal activity that has occurred or is occurring. We conclude that respondent's order is not void for failure of the affidavit to state a good cause as required by article 52.02(b)(1).
[50] We also note that relator has not cited any cases that hold such an error would be jurisdictional.
[51] The relator next contends, in several points of error, that the respondent is disqualified because he (1) is interested in the outcome of the Court of Inquiry; (2) has been of counsel in the case; and (3) is the accuser in this case, and relator cannot cross-examine him.
[52] Article 5, section 11 of the Texas Constitution states that no judge shall sit in any case where he may be interested, and Rule 18a, Tex.R.Civ.P. states as follows:
[53] At least 10 days before the date set for trial or other hearing in any court other than the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, or the Court of Appeals, any party may file with the clerk of the court a motion stating grounds why the judge before whom the case is pending should not sit in the case. The grounds may include any disability of the judge to sit in the case. The motion shall be verified and must state with particularity the grounds why the judge before whom the case is pending should not sit. The motion shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts that would be admissible in evidence provided that facts may be stated upon information and belief if the grounds of such belief are specifically stated.
[54] As heretofore noted, apparently some hearing was held before Judge Banales of the 105th District Court of Nueces County, pertaining to a motion to recuse. Because we do not have the record of that hearing, we do not know what allegations were made in the motion, and we do not know what disposition, if any, was made of the motion.
[55] Each of the relator's contentions made in the instant suit that the respondent is disqualified or should be recused may have been heard in the hearing before Judge Banales. Rule 18a(f) provides a method of appeal where a motion to recuse is denied.
[56] In the instant case, if the relator made all the allegations in the hearing before Judge Banales that he made in this case, and if his motion was denied, he had the right of appeal. In the event Judge Banales made no disposition of the relator's motion or in the event the allegations made by relator in the instant case were not made in the motion before Judge Banales, Rule 18a provides an adequate remedy at law for the relator.
[57] A writ of mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy at law. Strake v. Court of Appeals,704 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tex.1986); State ex rel. Jerry Cobb v. Godfrey, 739 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Because relator has an adequate remedy at law determining the issues of disqualification and recusal, a writ of mandamus is not the proper procedure to determine these issues.
[58] The relator also contends that the respondent's order is invalid because it fails to give adequate notice of the scope of the inquiry to be made.
[59] Relator does not contend that he has not received the 10-day statutory notice required by article 52.01(b)(2), but contends that the content of the respondent's affidavit is insufficient to give him adequate notice to defend himself as required by article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. Section 10 provides that an accused shall have the "right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof."
[60] Respondent's affidavit names one individual whose rights have been affected, it states what rights have been affected; it states in what case the alleged events have occurred; and it states what criminal statute has been violated. It does not state what the specific facts are, and, other than the relator, it does not specify the names of the parties referred to in the affidavit.
[61] Neither article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, nor article 52.01(b)(2), Tex. Code Crim. P. set forth the extent to which an affidavit must state specific facts to give adequate notice to persons subpoenaed to testify at a Court of Inquiry. We can find no cases on point, so we look to other case law for guidance.
[62] It is well established in Texas that in felony prosecutions, an indictment must specifically state the facts upon which the State relies so as to give the defendant adequate notice of the crime he allegedly committed. However, it appears to be equally well established that the requisites of a complaint or affidavit to support a prosecution under an information are not as stringent as the requirements for a complaint for a search or arrest warrant. Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 975); Gholson v. State, 667 S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex.App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd).
[63] If the requirements or the affidavits were less stringent, as in Wells and Gholson, where charged had been made and the defendants had been placed under arrest, it would seem less likely in an investigative procedure as here, where no charges have been filed and no arrest has been made, that the more stringent requirements of an affidavit for an arrest or search warrant would be required.
[64] Under federal law, where subpoenas have been issued by an administrative agency and notice requirements have been attacked, the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is not implicated because an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights. Likewise, the Court held that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is not offended because criminal proceedings have not been initiated. S.E.C. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U. S. 735, 81 L. Ed. 2d 615, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).
[65] As in O'Brien, the present case is an investigative matter, and no criminal proceedings have been initiated. Similarly, as in Wells and Gholson, it would seem that less stringent requirements for an affidavit would be necessary. This is especially so where the procedure is only investigative in nature, and criminal charges may or may not result. We conclude that the respondent's affidavit provides the relator with sufficient notice to apprise him of the scope of the inquiry to be made in the Court of Inquiry ordered by the respondent.
[66] Finally, we disagree with relator that article 52 is unconstitutional on its face and deprives him of his due process rights. A statute may be consistent with due process but by its application, or use, or by construction, be applied in a manner that would deny due process. Smith v. State, 311 U.S. 128, 85 L. Ed. 84, 61 S. Ct. 164 (1940).
[67] Although the Supreme Court of the United States in its memorandum opinion in McClelland v. State, 382 U.S. 928, 15 L. Ed. 2d 340, 86 S. Ct. 307 (1965), noted that the present Texas Court of Inquiry statute has "grave constitutional questions by conducting such proceedings," we are of the opinion that the constitutional questions alluded to by that court will only arise if in the statute's usage and construction, constitutional rights during the proceedings are not afforded to the parties involved. At the present time, the Court of Inquiry has not yet convened and the proceedings have not commenced. Although it may prove difficult under article 52 to provide constitutional safeguards, we will not presume that the respondent will deny the relator his due process constitutional rights when the Court of Inquiry is held. Because the relator has not shown that the respondent has clearly abused his discretion or violated a duty imposed upon him by the law, and because the relator has an adequate remedy at law, we hold that the relator is not entitled to the relief he has prayed for.
[68] This Court's order staying the Court of Inquiry hearing is hereby set aside, and the relator's petition for mandamus is overruled.
Judges Footnotes
[69] *fn* Assigned to this case by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code An.. § 74.003 (Vernon 1988).
19890518
© 1998 VersusLaw Inc.
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Securing convictions malum in se when the "issue" is regulatory "white collar" in nature......if ur white that is.....
adjective
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
~~~~`~~~~~~~~~~~~~
n Nueces County and throughout South Texas, Mary Leyendecker and Allen Fiszman organized so well. Thanks to county chairs who helped. And, as with good Democrats throughout the country, even folks with differences set them aside to help. The names of people who don't ordinarily come together came together for this campaign, and I thank each and every one of you.
Special thanks to Ami Sanchez and Garreth Broesche for undertaking event and finance efforts on an increasingly large scale. And, to Belinda Castro and Linda George Smith for extraordinary volunteer work.
In Nacogdoches County, thanks to Brenda Willett whose wise counsel and hard work got out the flyers we needed.
In North Texas, we've had so many people to thank, and wanted to make sure we include Paul and Carolyn Hood in Plano, Donna Turman, Trudy Hess, Tom Marking, Liz Wally, Grace Morrison, Jackie Fleschman, Terry Taylor, and Larry Shulman.
Thank you to Deborah Landis for the hundreds of calls, making a huge difference into East Texas, and the same for wonderful folks too numerous to name, but including Louise Chandler, and Sharon McMahon and Resa Harrison and Diane Podorsky and Janie Beltran and Alison Dieter and Anne Sigler of Huntsville and Barbara and Calvin Simper. And of course to Shirley Walston for her Smith County calls.
I will be mentioning my friends in Harris County, but the huge percentage improvements in Harris didn't just happen and the thousands of people who found their yet-changed-again polling places across the state thanks to hard work are to be congratulated.
Thanks to BAND and John Cobarruvias for poll dressing and GOTV, once again. The NASA funding cuts have hit the community and our scientific future. The hurricane damage along the Texas Coast and in East Texas doesn't receive the attention or the dollars that other states have received, yet those Texas communities which have been devastated know the struggles caused by federal inattention and incompetence. The voters in East Texas who got to the polls are very much appreciated. Recent visits to East Texas still show the story of devasation and loss, not limited to the disasters other states suffered. The difference: other states' leaders fought hard and successfully for their federal dollars, while Texas received a pittance. It's a pattern which has left Texas ranked 47th in bacon brought home by our state-wide elected officials who wrongly claim success and popularity.
BAR
Permalink
April 13, Note from the BlackDems
Congratulations! We are proud to have supported you Barbara and we plan to continue to do so in the general election as well. You earned your victory as well as the respect of our membership with your sincerity and competency.
James E. Robertson, Jr.
Permalink
April 11 Election Day Blog
I won the runoff with 60 percent of the vote, and the papers now voice a recognition of the potential strength of the grass roots. Thousands of indivduals were responsible for this decisive statewide win. It's early on April 12. I'm getting ready to head out to Austin after my morning run for meetings and a news conference for the statewide Democratic candidates. We are enjoying so many well-wishers' e mails and status reports. Mary Leyendecker organized Nueces County and worked tirelessly, and reports from Corpus Christi, where grass roots efforts turned around the primary results.
"Nueces Co. Courthouse was filled with supporters for the local races. Many people shook my hand - pals from the campaign trail - they voted for you and are so happy for your success statewide and in Nueces Co. Mike Creacy, his wife, their son William and numerous others are due a world of thanks for their support, expertise, excellent ideas, and hands-on efforts... never mind that today was election day, and another might have said enough's enough, Mike and his team copied and distributed stacks of campaign flyers to make that extra effort to get out the vote. We got signs up at all the sites. Ms. Josie Suarez said she and her family campaigned so effectively they believe they can attribute 800 votes in Robstown to their efforts."
One person can make a huge difference. Johnny Shelton came to the Victory Party sunburned from tremendous blockwalking for us, yet again. Lloyd Criss, Galveston County Chair, organized Galveston beautifully, bought ads, sent out cards. Lloyd was one of the first county chairs to endorse me and his in-kind help was immeasurable, as were so many of the county chairs, who personally donated and created a network of grass roots support. Galveston County's efforts in the runoff increased my vote from 42% in the first primary to 65.95% in the runoff. Their mailings, newspaper ads, calls, door-to-door, and polling place work was brilliant. Lubbock field was extraordinarily well organized, and county chair Johnnie Jones, Sue Wexler and our next Congressman Robert Ricketts have been with me from the beginning.
And from Burnet County, the extraordinarily hard working Democratic Chair Shirley Schmidt sent a great e mail as a status report. Guy Stuart and his family have done more than we can list, as well. Shirley wrote:
"....Burnet County, 157 votes for Radnofsky to 14 for Kelly. We hope that is the story throughout Texas. I was on the phone all day today. When I saw the last Democratic voters in all 4 Precincts, there were voters I'd called today. The last voters in two precincts were individuals who hadn't voted in the primary but promised to vote today, and they showed up. As many of 1/3 of the voters in at least one Precinct were individuals I'd called today."
I hope this small selection of the reports gives an idea across the state, every region, every area, of the grass roots efforts in small towns, rural Texas, which must not be forgotten, as well as our cities, which face such tremendous burdens. We've updated the issues chart on the issues section, and will be adding a sobering figure which answers my opponent's boast that she has brought home the bacon: Texas ranks 47th out of our 50 states in such funding brought home.
As the issues we've been highlighting hit Texans hard, we will continue to thank the grass roots folks who have educated me, helped me with financial and moral support and who made this win possible, but it would take thousands and thousands of blog entries to do so. The numbers paint an extraordinary picture of help across the state, as does a nearly twenty point improvement in five weeks.
My family and I voted together today, after I took my mother to the polls. We enjoyed the day thoroughly and really liked the news at the end of the day as AP was the first to call the race at an early hour. Maria Selma's was packed, and it was exciting to go from staffer phone to staffer phone as calls of support and congratulations came in.
We also hit the one million dollars raised mark on April 11. A Republican friend donated 4200 dollars to get us to the edge. The online donation from Carol Lewis (the olympic track star and broadcaster), sister to Radnofsky supporter and Olympian Carl Lewis appears to have hit the one millionth mark, and several others hit about the same time, including ones from my law firm partners to whom who I bid farewell this past Monday as I announced my departure from Vinson and Elkins.
The office is running smoothly with volunteer personnel and staff staying busy and our donated furniture and electronics beautifully cobbled together.
We were able to thank some but not all our well wishers and hard workers on the webcast last night, and to see the great band's performance and hear about others who helped, please view and listen to the webcast on-line. Jet Set, the phenomenal band, also recorded the campaign song: http://radnofsky.com/press/Barbara%20Ann.mp3
We know Senator Hutchison and her staff study my blog, so we want them to know I'll be in Austin, San Antonio, Houston, and DFW in the next week, then on to DC where the Democratic Senate Leadership co-hosts a fundraiser for me on April 25. We await Sen. Hutchison's dates for a series of debates, as she has finally responded in the press to my call for debates that she's looking forward to discussing the issues in public. Let's hope she makes good on what her spokesmen say, as this race has been correctly characterized by commentators as a referendum on the direction in which this state and country are headed. The downfall of DeLay emphasizes this race, and that's good, as is life. Thanks. BAR
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
~~~~`~~~~~~~~~~~~~
n Nueces County and throughout South Texas, Mary Leyendecker and Allen Fiszman organized so well. Thanks to county chairs who helped. And, as with good Democrats throughout the country, even folks with differences set them aside to help. The names of people who don't ordinarily come together came together for this campaign, and I thank each and every one of you.
Special thanks to Ami Sanchez and Garreth Broesche for undertaking event and finance efforts on an increasingly large scale. And, to Belinda Castro and Linda George Smith for extraordinary volunteer work.
In Nacogdoches County, thanks to Brenda Willett whose wise counsel and hard work got out the flyers we needed.
In North Texas, we've had so many people to thank, and wanted to make sure we include Paul and Carolyn Hood in Plano, Donna Turman, Trudy Hess, Tom Marking, Liz Wally, Grace Morrison, Jackie Fleschman, Terry Taylor, and Larry Shulman.
Thank you to Deborah Landis for the hundreds of calls, making a huge difference into East Texas, and the same for wonderful folks too numerous to name, but including Louise Chandler, and Sharon McMahon and Resa Harrison and Diane Podorsky and Janie Beltran and Alison Dieter and Anne Sigler of Huntsville and Barbara and Calvin Simper. And of course to Shirley Walston for her Smith County calls.
I will be mentioning my friends in Harris County, but the huge percentage improvements in Harris didn't just happen and the thousands of people who found their yet-changed-again polling places across the state thanks to hard work are to be congratulated.
Thanks to BAND and John Cobarruvias for poll dressing and GOTV, once again. The NASA funding cuts have hit the community and our scientific future. The hurricane damage along the Texas Coast and in East Texas doesn't receive the attention or the dollars that other states have received, yet those Texas communities which have been devastated know the struggles caused by federal inattention and incompetence. The voters in East Texas who got to the polls are very much appreciated. Recent visits to East Texas still show the story of devasation and loss, not limited to the disasters other states suffered. The difference: other states' leaders fought hard and successfully for their federal dollars, while Texas received a pittance. It's a pattern which has left Texas ranked 47th in bacon brought home by our state-wide elected officials who wrongly claim success and popularity.
BAR
Permalink
April 13, Note from the BlackDems
Congratulations! We are proud to have supported you Barbara and we plan to continue to do so in the general election as well. You earned your victory as well as the respect of our membership with your sincerity and competency.
James E. Robertson, Jr.
Permalink
April 11 Election Day Blog
I won the runoff with 60 percent of the vote, and the papers now voice a recognition of the potential strength of the grass roots. Thousands of indivduals were responsible for this decisive statewide win. It's early on April 12. I'm getting ready to head out to Austin after my morning run for meetings and a news conference for the statewide Democratic candidates. We are enjoying so many well-wishers' e mails and status reports. Mary Leyendecker organized Nueces County and worked tirelessly, and reports from Corpus Christi, where grass roots efforts turned around the primary results.
"Nueces Co. Courthouse was filled with supporters for the local races. Many people shook my hand - pals from the campaign trail - they voted for you and are so happy for your success statewide and in Nueces Co. Mike Creacy, his wife, their son William and numerous others are due a world of thanks for their support, expertise, excellent ideas, and hands-on efforts... never mind that today was election day, and another might have said enough's enough, Mike and his team copied and distributed stacks of campaign flyers to make that extra effort to get out the vote. We got signs up at all the sites. Ms. Josie Suarez said she and her family campaigned so effectively they believe they can attribute 800 votes in Robstown to their efforts."
One person can make a huge difference. Johnny Shelton came to the Victory Party sunburned from tremendous blockwalking for us, yet again. Lloyd Criss, Galveston County Chair, organized Galveston beautifully, bought ads, sent out cards. Lloyd was one of the first county chairs to endorse me and his in-kind help was immeasurable, as were so many of the county chairs, who personally donated and created a network of grass roots support. Galveston County's efforts in the runoff increased my vote from 42% in the first primary to 65.95% in the runoff. Their mailings, newspaper ads, calls, door-to-door, and polling place work was brilliant. Lubbock field was extraordinarily well organized, and county chair Johnnie Jones, Sue Wexler and our next Congressman Robert Ricketts have been with me from the beginning.
And from Burnet County, the extraordinarily hard working Democratic Chair Shirley Schmidt sent a great e mail as a status report. Guy Stuart and his family have done more than we can list, as well. Shirley wrote:
"....Burnet County, 157 votes for Radnofsky to 14 for Kelly. We hope that is the story throughout Texas. I was on the phone all day today. When I saw the last Democratic voters in all 4 Precincts, there were voters I'd called today. The last voters in two precincts were individuals who hadn't voted in the primary but promised to vote today, and they showed up. As many of 1/3 of the voters in at least one Precinct were individuals I'd called today."
I hope this small selection of the reports gives an idea across the state, every region, every area, of the grass roots efforts in small towns, rural Texas, which must not be forgotten, as well as our cities, which face such tremendous burdens. We've updated the issues chart on the issues section, and will be adding a sobering figure which answers my opponent's boast that she has brought home the bacon: Texas ranks 47th out of our 50 states in such funding brought home.
As the issues we've been highlighting hit Texans hard, we will continue to thank the grass roots folks who have educated me, helped me with financial and moral support and who made this win possible, but it would take thousands and thousands of blog entries to do so. The numbers paint an extraordinary picture of help across the state, as does a nearly twenty point improvement in five weeks.
My family and I voted together today, after I took my mother to the polls. We enjoyed the day thoroughly and really liked the news at the end of the day as AP was the first to call the race at an early hour. Maria Selma's was packed, and it was exciting to go from staffer phone to staffer phone as calls of support and congratulations came in.
We also hit the one million dollars raised mark on April 11. A Republican friend donated 4200 dollars to get us to the edge. The online donation from Carol Lewis (the olympic track star and broadcaster), sister to Radnofsky supporter and Olympian Carl Lewis appears to have hit the one millionth mark, and several others hit about the same time, including ones from my law firm partners to whom who I bid farewell this past Monday as I announced my departure from Vinson and Elkins.
The office is running smoothly with volunteer personnel and staff staying busy and our donated furniture and electronics beautifully cobbled together.
We were able to thank some but not all our well wishers and hard workers on the webcast last night, and to see the great band's performance and hear about others who helped, please view and listen to the webcast on-line. Jet Set, the phenomenal band, also recorded the campaign song: http://radnofsky.com/press/Barbara%20Ann.mp3
We know Senator Hutchison and her staff study my blog, so we want them to know I'll be in Austin, San Antonio, Houston, and DFW in the next week, then on to DC where the Democratic Senate Leadership co-hosts a fundraiser for me on April 25. We await Sen. Hutchison's dates for a series of debates, as she has finally responded in the press to my call for debates that she's looking forward to discussing the issues in public. Let's hope she makes good on what her spokesmen say, as this race has been correctly characterized by commentators as a referendum on the direction in which this state and country are headed. The downfall of DeLay emphasizes this race, and that's good, as is life. Thanks. BAR
WAKE~UP~CALL ...caught you in the ACT~Cornyn and Keller two rotten peons in a pod............
adjective
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
COMMENTARY: W. GARDNER SELBY
Cornyn vote on kids' health insurance might not hurt him
Do voters overlook health care as a priority issue?
Listen to this article or download audio file.Click-2-Listen
By W. Gardner Selby
AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Thursday, October 11, 2007
U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, assured himself of being peppered when he voted against bolstering the Children's Health Insurance Plan serving children of the working poor.
Even so, two political consultants insist that his position — rating a Democrat-steered approach too expensive and too expansive — won't hurt him.
Alicia Mireles
AMERICAN-STATESMAN
(enlarge photo)
W. Gardner Selby
MORE W. GARDNER SELBY
W. GARDNER SELBY
* Cornyn vote on kids' health insurance might not hurt him
* Two governors handled mansion renovation differently
* Unless he confesses, it's not Dewhurst's fault Texas has no early primary
* Hutchison may leave early, won't seek re-electio
What's this?
Todd Smith of Austin and Craig Murphy of Arlington should know. They coached then-state Rep. Arlene Wohlgemuth in her unsuccessful 2004 challenge to U.S. Rep. Chet Edwards, D-Texas.
Wohlgemuth snagged the GOP nomination after stressing her role whittling the Texas CHIP to help the state plug a shortfall without higher taxes. Edwards then launched a TV ad painting her as slashing health care for children.
"Very well crafted," Smith said. "Extremely effective."
But no Republican will make cutting CHIP a campaign centerpiece next year, he said, unless they tumble into a trap.
Wohlgemuth scrambled, Murphy suggested, because she wasn't widely known before Edwards popped her. Cornyn shouldn't have an identity problem, nor will he lack resources to deliver his message.
The other Texas senator, Kay Bailey Hutchison, voted for the CHIP proposal, though she conceded that she had valid concerns about the measure and said President Bush should sit down with Congress to ensure CHIP's continuation.
After vetoing the proposal opposed by Cornyn, Bush said he's open to negotiations. And Cornyn has said he supports a lesser expenditure.
Political fallout will ultimately turn on whether voters choose candidates based on health care. Other topics — perhaps war, immigration, education or taxes — are likely to rule.
In last year's Senate race, for instance, the Iraq war proved to be the major issue. Meanwhile, Hutchison said in a debate that a Republican-ushered ban on the government negotiating lower prescription drug prices for senior citizens should be looked at. Her comment drew scant attention. She and Cornyn later voted against bringing up a House-approved measure permitting negotiations, saying the current system works well.
Health care debates certainly fuel suspicions. Cornyn has said the sought CHIP changes amount to a taxpayer-funded benefit for the middle class that is likely to hurt private insurance providers. Scott McCown of the Austin-based Center for Public Policy Priorities said Cornyn may have misunderstood or misrepresented the proposal.
Opponents of the plan, McCown said, are upset at CHIP because it works: "They don't want to provide health care to the American people, and they don't want to pay for it. It's that simple."
I have doubts; simplicity out of Washington would be too much of a miracle.
wgselby@statesman.com; 445-3644 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\
Cornyn must be stupid, I am sorry, Lo siento, he is just clueless.
Why should taxpayers pay his AND for his entourage AND his family "taxpayer funded health care"?
They're SPESHHHal.....like "the church lady" says it on SNL.
What a freeloading carpetbagger! He and his Patriot group familia should move to Iraq along with their "OPM" funded JOB.
Healthcare we pay for.........but he is special?
Yeah , so slow to show his patriotism when it is not BENEFICIAL to his so called "Patriot group".
Since he does not care anymore.... and, it is obvious,"I don't feel so bad".......What a dud, maybe if the GOP was serious about backing him he would have more money than Mikal Watts.
But according to Stopcornyn.com's interview "Rick Perry Noriega" said he looks forward to "helping Cornyn enjoy"........that Noriega has informed and acted like he was one of those desperados, claiming dire straits, and in financial need..... they are no doubt stupid,since it was BS in his own words Noreiga states: "As it turns out, I have the necessary resources as well."
What was that warning Eisenhower warned us about?
Of or concerned with charity: altruistic, benevolent, charitable, philanthropic, philanthropically. See give/take/reciprocity, kind/cruel.
r u SURE?
Without The Education "District" Code, would not have an election code to fight over.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
COMMENTARY: W. GARDNER SELBY
Cornyn vote on kids' health insurance might not hurt him
Do voters overlook health care as a priority issue?
Listen to this article or download audio file.Click-2-Listen
By W. Gardner Selby
AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Thursday, October 11, 2007
U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, assured himself of being peppered when he voted against bolstering the Children's Health Insurance Plan serving children of the working poor.
Even so, two political consultants insist that his position — rating a Democrat-steered approach too expensive and too expansive — won't hurt him.
Alicia Mireles
AMERICAN-STATESMAN
(enlarge photo)
W. Gardner Selby
MORE W. GARDNER SELBY
W. GARDNER SELBY
* Cornyn vote on kids' health insurance might not hurt him
* Two governors handled mansion renovation differently
* Unless he confesses, it's not Dewhurst's fault Texas has no early primary
* Hutchison may leave early, won't seek re-electio
What's this?
Todd Smith of Austin and Craig Murphy of Arlington should know. They coached then-state Rep. Arlene Wohlgemuth in her unsuccessful 2004 challenge to U.S. Rep. Chet Edwards, D-Texas.
Wohlgemuth snagged the GOP nomination after stressing her role whittling the Texas CHIP to help the state plug a shortfall without higher taxes. Edwards then launched a TV ad painting her as slashing health care for children.
"Very well crafted," Smith said. "Extremely effective."
But no Republican will make cutting CHIP a campaign centerpiece next year, he said, unless they tumble into a trap.
Wohlgemuth scrambled, Murphy suggested, because she wasn't widely known before Edwards popped her. Cornyn shouldn't have an identity problem, nor will he lack resources to deliver his message.
The other Texas senator, Kay Bailey Hutchison, voted for the CHIP proposal, though she conceded that she had valid concerns about the measure and said President Bush should sit down with Congress to ensure CHIP's continuation.
After vetoing the proposal opposed by Cornyn, Bush said he's open to negotiations. And Cornyn has said he supports a lesser expenditure.
Political fallout will ultimately turn on whether voters choose candidates based on health care. Other topics — perhaps war, immigration, education or taxes — are likely to rule.
In last year's Senate race, for instance, the Iraq war proved to be the major issue. Meanwhile, Hutchison said in a debate that a Republican-ushered ban on the government negotiating lower prescription drug prices for senior citizens should be looked at. Her comment drew scant attention. She and Cornyn later voted against bringing up a House-approved measure permitting negotiations, saying the current system works well.
Health care debates certainly fuel suspicions. Cornyn has said the sought CHIP changes amount to a taxpayer-funded benefit for the middle class that is likely to hurt private insurance providers. Scott McCown of the Austin-based Center for Public Policy Priorities said Cornyn may have misunderstood or misrepresented the proposal.
Opponents of the plan, McCown said, are upset at CHIP because it works: "They don't want to provide health care to the American people, and they don't want to pay for it. It's that simple."
I have doubts; simplicity out of Washington would be too much of a miracle.
wgselby@statesman.com; 445-3644 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\
Cornyn must be stupid, I am sorry, Lo siento, he is just clueless.
Why should taxpayers pay his AND for his entourage AND his family "taxpayer funded health care"?
They're SPESHHHal.....like "the church lady" says it on SNL.
What a freeloading carpetbagger! He and his Patriot group familia should move to Iraq along with their "OPM" funded JOB.
Healthcare we pay for.........but he is special?
Yeah , so slow to show his patriotism when it is not BENEFICIAL to his so called "Patriot group".
Since he does not care anymore.... and, it is obvious,"I don't feel so bad".......What a dud, maybe if the GOP was serious about backing him he would have more money than Mikal Watts.
But according to Stopcornyn.com's interview "Rick Perry Noriega" said he looks forward to "helping Cornyn enjoy"........that Noriega has informed and acted like he was one of those desperados, claiming dire straits, and in financial need..... they are no doubt stupid,since it was BS in his own words Noreiga states: "As it turns out, I have the necessary resources as well."
What was that warning Eisenhower warned us about?
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